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1 Regulation and Industry Change: reversing cause and eﬀect
The link between the evolution of regulatory institutions and the development of new schemes for value
creation within an industry (i.e, its business model) has most often been studied from the angle of how
sectorial change has aﬀected the institutionalization of new policy instruments. More precisely, the
line of questioning generally adopted has been whether or not political actors have sought to simply
follow long term trends within an industrial sector - e.g., technological breaks or the evolving structure
of innovation (Aghion and Howitt 1992), its exogenous conditions (Kane 1981) and more recently,
economic crisis (Tirole 2012) - by creating an appropriate regulatory framework, consistent with the
new environment in which private actors operate. If bureaucrats or politicians appear to have failed to
ensure that new processes of value creation are translated into regulatory institutions that match the
dynamics of the sector in question, other scholars regularly allege the capture of the political process by
interest groups (Carpenter and Moss 2014). When alternatives make core activities that have generated
profits for an industry obsolete or when its assets fail to generate value as they once did (McGahan
2004), firms and corporate actors reticent about, or unable to, change are indeed more likely to struggle
to preserve existing institutions or, more frequently, to seek the protection from new ones – thereby
orienting bureaucratic or political eﬀorts towards taking safeguard measures rather than adapting or
adjusting regulatory instruments to the evolutions of the market (Posner 1971, Stigler 1971).
Moving beyond these conceptualizations, however, Political Scientists have recently uncovered several
examples where such common views prevent a full understanding of the status of regulation vis-à-vis
industrial sectors and, by extension, markets. Indeed, studies led by scholars focusing on regulatory
dynamics and regulatory operations have shown that the outcomes of regulatory institutions should be
interpreted through their capacities to shape a conceptual order of credible and/or relevant information
that otherwise might not exist (Carpenter 2004; Law and Libecap 2006). More fundamentally, this
claim relies on the assumption that the market constitutes a set of prospects which, according to the
mathematical theory of expectations (Billingsley 1999) “rely upon probability measures and in turn,
upon countable and co-countable spaces” (Carpenter 2009). Put diﬀerently, regulation does not solely
entail behaviors related to the new (dis)incentives it provides, but also aﬀects beliefs leading to market
operations, as well as promoting certain categories while delegitimizing others (Smith 2016). From this
viewpoint, and because it creates the conditions for confidence (De Boef and Kellstedt 2004), regulation
may be seen as an essential condition of possibility for marketplaces.
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When associated with the issue of industrial change, this perspective oﬀers an alternative way of
conceptualizing the connection of this process to regulatory models or institutions. In some cases,
regulation should be at least the prior condition for the emergence of a new business model, weakening
some arguments at the core of capture and rent-seeking theories of regulation. This assumption relies
on the capacity of the regulator to guarantee the safety and the quality of the new products or practices
implied by an emerging change within a sector or, more broadly, because it may control several types of
"lemons" problems occurring as a consequence of this process (Akerlof 1970). In addition, and because
the development of a new business model has close links with the risk subjectively associated with the
renewed form of commodities put on the market by consumers or any actor concerned (Heimann and
Larry 1997), it may also be favored (and even caused) by the (regulatory) building of new principles,
expectations, priorities or through the structuring of a particular demand (Carpenter 2010a). In this
context, the reputation of the bureaucratic entity in charge of implementing those concepts appears to
be a latent driving force, conditioning their eﬀectiveness: actors within or outside the industry would be
more able to recognize new forms of labels, products or rules of exchange if they are promoted through
legitimate institutions, whose organizational image is associated with technical expertise, responsibility
or competence (Carpenter 2010b).
If information, confidence and reputation (as three forms of beliefs structured through and by reg-
ulation) may be conceptualized as basic conditions for industrial change, there remains a residue of
ambiguity concerning two critical questions. The first is that of causal mechanisms: how is the institu-
tionalization of new regulatory schemes eﬀectively perceived as a (positive or negative) signal, which in
turn engenders specific conducts? One can expect that one impact of regulation would be to generate
a dynamic of bureaucratic-industrial adaptation (by analogy with political-bureaucratic adaptation, see
Wood and Waterman 1993) observable over time. A second question concerns the eﬀect of regulation
on the transition from a business model to another per se : what is, in the long run, the role played by
regulation in the stabilization of new forms of value creation within an industry?
The aim of this article is to address this twofold challenge by drawing upon an empirical analysis
of the stock market valuation of US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) "Orphan Drug" regulatory
approvals. The US Orphan Drug Act was implemented in 1983 with the provision of several financial
incentives designed to foster rare disease drug research and development (R&D), notably a seven-year
marketing exclusivity for the treatments in question that we are considering in more detail in this
paper. Operating within the FDA regulatory framework, this law defines an orphan drug as one "with
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eﬃcacy against a disease aﬀecting fewer than 200,000 people in the United States" (Haﬀner 2006). It
is generally considered as a turning point: during the previous decade only 10 drugs were marketed for
rare diseases and only 36 rare disease treatments had ever been authorized by the FDA. Since then,
more than 400 orphan treatments have been approved (Seoane-Vasquez and al. 2008). Over the same
period, scholars identified a change of business model within the pharmaceutical industry. Blockbuster
oriented between the years 1960 to 1980, the sector experienced during the following decades a long-term
decline of R&D productivity. A paradigm shift towards a new "nichebuster" model capable of filling
the void created by this weakening of the previous one is said to have occurred (Montalban and Sakinç
2013). Whereas the pharmaceutical industry once produced mainly (relatively) cheap treatments for
large populations during the major part of the century, the last thirty years it has tended to concentrate
upon smaller groups of patients, more specialized products and very expensive ones (Messori et al. 2010)
- three properties of orphan drugs, which represented between 1983 and 2006 more than 55% of the new
molecular entities approved by the FDA (Haﬀner 2006). In this context, has the Orphan Drug Act
acted as a positive signal, contributing to reorientating the conduct of the actors in the market? Did
it participate in the shift from the blockbuster model to the nichebuster model in the pharmaceutical
industry? And, in sum, how has this particular piece of regulation aﬀected beliefs by providing actors
with information, confidence and on the basis of the reputation of those in charge of its implementation?
To answer this question, we have modelled and tested the financial impact of FDA orphan drug
approval decisions between 1983 and 2013. Our choice to focus on stock markets rather than the
pharmaceutical industry itself is related to methodological and empirical concerns. On the one hand,
the impact of a new legislation on the changing business model of an industry is diﬃcult to measure
through formal modelling. Shifting the reasoning to the reaction of stock markets allows us to observe
the legitimacy of orphan drug from the view of a third actor and, by extension, the perception of
this new category of product guaranteed by a regulator, the FDA. A second concern is more directly
related to the structure of the pharmaceutical industry, and its recent transformations. During the last
thirty years, and in the context of the evolution of its business model, the industry has experienced a
growing financialization of its activities, which now constitutes a key aspect of the development of an
increasing number of products, including mostly orphan drugs (Gagnon 2006). As a result, the viability
of the rising engagement of pharmaceutical companies in new types of products stands and falls with
its acceptance by investors. As the latter are mainly interested in value creation, an assessment of the
3
impact of orphan drug R&D on stock market valuations appears to be the most appropriate way to deal
with this critical issue.
On this basis, we assume that in a context of uncertainty regarding the properties of orphan drugs
during the years 1960 and 1970, the Orphan Drug Act may be considered as a political signal in favor
of the development of commercial outlets for these products. This signal was then institutionalized
through the FDA regulatory framework, a bureaucratic organization who played (and continued to
play) a pivotal function in shaping and orienting the pharmaceutical market, condensing several forms
of reputation and expertise (Carpenter 2010a, 2010b, Maor 2010, 2013, Maor et al. 2013). Regulatory
approvals of orphan drugs by the FDA have thus acted as a mediation, iteratively reproducing this
signal and combining it with several incentives. Investors have, positively or not, sanctioned this source
of information (the approbation of a product labelled as "orphan drug") based on their confidence in
this repeated signal. In return, their behaviors (and in fact, regulation) has had a causal eﬀect on the
reorientation of the business model of the pharmaceutical industry, contributing to stabilizing the shift
in its R&D policy. In sum, the Orphan Drug Act as regulatory politics within the FDA would have
rendered the outcomes in the market more countable and more integrable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews existing literature in
the field and justifies choices regarding data selection and statistical methods. Our model is presented
in section 3. Findings are reported in section 4 and discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Orphan Drugs and stock market reactions to regulatory
announcements
The history of the Orphan Drug Act is generally told as a success story. Before the entering into
force of this specific orphan drug legislation, R&D of treatments against rare diseases had came to a
dead end: the rigorous drug safety requirements of the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendment dramatically
increased the costs of drug development, inciting pharmaceutical companies to concentrate their eﬀorts
on common diseases and to disengage from rare disease treatments. Since 1983, Orphan drug R&D has
clearly increased considerably. Indeed, the pace of applications for orphan drug status ("orphan drug
designations" in the FDA terminology) is clearly still quickening. In the 1980s, the average number
of yearly orphan drug designations was 54.67; in the present decade, this average number has risen to
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211.25 (66.00 in the 1990s and 115.20 in the first decade of the 21th century). How far has regulation
contributed to legitimizing this category of products amongst actors who have financially supported
pharmaceutical companies?
Existing literature on stock market reaction to bureaucratic signals addresses several related ques-
tions: a) stock market reactions to news, b) the reaction of stock prices to decisions (concerning non-
orphan treatments) of the FDA (or corresponding European agencies), and c) the impact of FDA orphan
drug approvals on the eﬀective duration of market exclusivity.
Fama et al. (1969) highlight a significant positive impact of stock splits on share prices, presumably
due to the amelioration of investors’ dividend expectations. Quarterly earnings announcements also
induce significant eﬀects on the stock returns of the concerned companies (MacKinley 1997). Cuellar
Fernandez et al. (2010) have examined press releases concerning ICT firms (information and commu-
nication technology): they find that investors react positively to diversification, position-consolidating,
and growth, but negatively to new product launches, apparently considered as risky. More closely re-
lated to the specific industrial background of our paper, Campart and Pfister highlight significant stock
price fluctuations induced by legal disputes about intellectual property rights between pharmaceutical
and biotechnological firms (Campart and Pfister 2002), as well as positive stock price responses to the
formation of partnerships between firms belonging to this sector (Campart and Pfister 2003).
Evidence for positive stock price reactions to FDA announcements is given by Bosch and Lee (1994),
Sharma and Lacey (2004) and Shortridge (2004). In this context, Campart and Pfister (2008) show that
positive news concerning one firm induce significant stock price decreases among its direct competitors.
Interestingly, markets seem to react negatively to first moves, i.e. to the fact that a firm is the first to
enter a specific drug market segment (Sarkar and de Jong 2006). Indirect evidence for insider trading
related to public FDA announcements of Phase III clinical trials is provided by Overgaard et al. (2000)
and Rothenstein et al. (2011). Meanwhile, Himmelmann and Schierek (2012) have identified liquidity
changes as possible sources of stock price increases induced by drug approval decisions of the European
Medicine Agency. Finally, Seoane-Vazquez et al. (2008) have investigated whether the orphan drug
market exclusivity device actually enables companies to extend the 20 years patent exploitation period1.
They find a relatively small influence: FDA orphan drug approvals extend the eﬀective marketing
monopoly lifetime by less than one year.
However, we are aware of no literature dedicated to the evaluation of the specific financial impact
1In fact, nearly every orphan treatment is also under patent cover.
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of orphan drug R&D. In this respect, we chose movements in stock market prices as a measure of
this financial impact. More specifically, we observed and analyzed percent changes in stock prices of
companies occurring around the disclosure of FDA orphan drug approval decisions concerning orphan
treatments developed by these companies. Stock prices are a particularly well suited variable, because
they reflect the financial interests of the two major company players: stock price increases correspond
to the creation of shareholder value; at the same time, stock price movements are critical for managers:
they determine what leeway there is for generous manager remuneration, they condition the likelihood
of takeovers, and have a decisive impact on managers’ reputations.
We will therefore concentrate on the question of how FDA orphan drug approval decisions influence
the stock prices of the involved pharmaceutical companies. Indeed, drug approvals are a critical step
within the access path of a new drug to the market. By extension, this process is closely connected to
the three components of investors’ beliefs: are orphan drug regulatory approvals perceived as a credible
source of information? Can they trust the regulator (confidence), on the basis of its expertise or its
social authority (reputation, see also Moﬃt 2010) - knowing that, just a few years before, investing in
orphan drugs R&D for manufacturers was not considered a legitimate option? This focus is also justified
by the fact that they are directly linked to one of the major devices of the US orphan drug legislation:
the seven-year market exclusivity period provided to FDA approved orphan treatments. Note in this
context the chronological order of events: as a first step, firms request an orphan drug designation,
which immediately triggers important orphan drug devices (tax credits, FDA fee waivers and eligibility
for clinical research subsidies); FDA orphan drug approval decisions generates (in cases of acceptance) a
second step and coincides with FDA marketing authorization for the treatment in question; importantly,
the seven-year market exclusivity period starts right from the FDA orphan drug approval decision2.
We counter-checked the results drawn from stock price movements by an event study approach,
i.e. we analyzed the evolution of abnormal stock returns occurring around FDA orphan drug approval
decision dates. Last but not least, we were confronted to the critical issue of disambiguation between the
eﬀects exerted by two types of FDA decisions: in fact, in the case of orphan treatments, FDA orphan
drug approval decisions and FDA marketing approval decisions are simultaneously announced. In order
to cope with this problem, we developed an innovative empirical approach: we built a paired-sample of
2It is worth noting that a priori, stock prices not only react to FDA orphan drug approvals, but also to orphan
drug designations, because the activation of important financial advantages (tax credits etc.) coincides with designation
requests. However, the evaluation of the impact of orphan drug designations on stock prices is beyond the scope of the
present paper.
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orphan drugs and corresponding non-orphan drugs and we then compared aggregate price changes by
means of the paired-sample Student’s t-test.
In the case of (small) biotechnological companies, our approach also provides insight into the question
of the funding impact of FDA orphan drug approval decisions: do these approvals enhance the companies’
capacities to finance future orphan drug R&D? In fact, stock market prices may be considered as a good
proxy for this funding impact, and this because they should be pushed up by FDA approval decisions,
improving thus the fund-raising capacities during future secondary equity oﬀerings3.
Our main finding is that FDA orphan drug approval decisions have a significant influence on the
evolution of the stock market prices and of returns of the concerned companies. Moreover, we are able
to show that simultaneous FDA marketing approval/orphan drug approval decisions induce significantly
higher stock price progressions than FDA "non-orphan" marketing approvals. These two results clearly
suggest that investors appreciate the seven-year orphan drug marketing exclusivity, which in turn, has
critical implications for our research question.
We invite the reader to keep in mind one important limitation of this study: the results presented
in section 4 hold exclusively for companies quoted on the stock market. No lesson can thus be drawn
concerning the entire population of orphan drug developing companies.
3 A statistical model of regulatory impact on financial valuation
According to the elements developed in section 1 and 2, we chose data and methods of data analysis
likely to highlight the impact of FDA orphan drug approval decisions on stock market valuations. Before
presenting theses features in the remainder of this section, we briefly recall the chronological order of
events:
1. A firm requests an orphan drug designation for some treatment; immediately, the firm benefits
from tax credits, FDA fee waivers and becomes eligible for clinical research subsidies ;
2. The FDA disseminates its orphan drug approval decision and its marketing authorization for the
treatment in question; immediately, the firm obtains the seven-year market exclusivity for this
orphan drug treatment.
3This question is not really important for big pharmaceutical companies, that are generally able to self-finance R&D.
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Following the approach of Overgaard et al. (2000), we have sought to illustrate the financial impact
of FDA orphan drug approval decisions by means of graphical representations of the evolution of stock
prices. More precisely, we decided to record stock price data going from 120 days before the FDA
approval to 120 days after it; in fact, this time interval has proven to be well-dimensioned, because it
allows to represent in a single graphic (i) periods where the FDA approval information has an impact
on stock price movements and (ii) periods where this information has clearly no influence (i.e. periods
far enough before and after this decision, e. g. Overgaard et al. (2000, figures 1 to 4) or Rothenstein et
al. (2011, figures 1 and 2)). Just like Overgaard et al. (2000), we defined "zero day" as the last trading
day before public disclosure of the FDA approval decision, "day -120" as the date occurring exactly 120
days before zero day and "day +120" as the date occurring exactly 120 days after it.
These methodological choices have practical implications to our data sample. Indeed, we could not
retain orphan drugs (i) developed by unquoted companies, (ii) developed by companies that launched
too late on stock markets (i.e. after the day -120 associated to the orphan drug in question), and (iii)
whose FDA approval dates are too recent to cover stock prices till day +120 (in practical terms: FDA
approval dates after 12-31-2012, because we established our sample in the month of July 2013)4. These
method constraints explain why our sample contains only 137 among the roughly 400 FDA approved
orphan treatments5. The 137 selected treatments had been developed by 60 diﬀerent companies listed on
the New York Stock Exchange, on the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
(NASDAQ) or involved in Over-The-Counter exchanges.
Since this paper aims at finding out general results about the financial impact of FDA orphan drug
approvals, we had to go beyond isolated case studies of the 137 orphan treatments. So we had to find
a way to aggregate sample data. In this context, we again adopted the approach of Overgaard et al.
(2000). First, we calculated for each treatment i the time series (from day -120 to day +120 ) of the
percentage changes ci,t of the associated stock prices between date day -120 and date t:
ci,t ⌘ Pi,t   Pi, 120
Pi, 120 8i, 8t 2 { 120, 119, ..., 0..., 120}, (1)
where Pi,t is the stock market price at date t of the company having developed treatment i. Then,
4Some drugs had to be excluded from the sample because the associated stock prices series were atypical, namely they
showed very few price movements (e. g. once a week).
5The term orphan treatment is more accurate than orphan drug, because one molecule may be counted several times
in our data base; in fact, one and the same molecule may be used in diﬀerent therapeutic fields, giving rise to several FDA
orphan drug approval decisions.
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we averaged these series over the entire sample in order to obtain the mean percentage change, noted
Ci,t :
Ci,t ⌘ 1
137
137X
i=1
ci,t 8t 2 { 120, ..., 120}. (2)
Time series graphs are likely to provide a first impression of the essential features of the evolution of
mean percentage change Ci,t. One should namely expect an eye-catching upward displacement around
zero day such as those highlighted by Overgaard et al. (2000, figures 1 to 4) and Rothenstein et al.
(2011, figures 1 and 2): indeed, stock markets are supposed to welcome FDA orphan drug approvals,
inducing increases of the associated stock prices.
The issue then arises whether this displacement is statistically significant. In order to answer this
question, we make use of several significance testing methods. In this context, it should be noted that
the standard event study approach results in an important loss of data (see below). Consequently, we
start with a somewhat non-standard method which allows us to exploit the entire set of 137 orphan
treatments. This method is based on an econometric time series model of Ci, t.
Time series modelling is especially useful when it comes to analyse the movements of some endogenous
variable in a context of lack of convenient exogenous variables (see Brockwell and Davis (1996) for a
comprehensive introduction to time series). We added to our Ci,t-time series model a dummy variable
intended to capture the informational shock conveyed by the FDA orphan drug approval. This dummy
variable is central to our first method of significance testing. In fact, we simply verified whether the
parameter estimation associated to this dummy variable is significant at standard confidence levels.
In order to countercheck the result thus obtained, we implemented the breakpoint test of Chow
(1960) which allows to decide upon the significance (or the absence of significance) of the structural
break represented by the upward displacement in the Ci,t series.
Event study methodology in the tradition of Fama et al. (1969) and Brown and Warner (1980, 1985)
is another way of verifying the significance results achieved with time series modelling. The general idea
of this approach is to break down firms’ returns into normal and abnormal returns, and then to observe
the evolution of aggregate abnormal returns over a time interval around the event-date (henceforth :
event-window). Since event study methodology warns strongly against any overlap in the event-windows
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associated to the diﬀerent orphan treatments (MacKinley 1997, p. 24), we chose a rather short time
window going from day -10 to day +10. In spite of this choice, we had to exclude no fewer than 60
observations from our data sample in order to avoid overlapping event-windows.
This easiest way of computing abnormal returns is given by the constant mean return model :
ri,t = µi + ai,t, (3)
where ri,t is the period t return of the firm having developed orphan treatment i, µi ⌘ 1110
P 11
t= 120 ri,t
the firm’s mean return over the estimation-window [day -120, day -11 ] and ai,t its abnormal return (with
a standard deviation which should be time-invariant). Following Brown and Warner (1985, p. 28), we
obtain the associated t-statistics by dividing ari,t by its estimated standard deviation:
✓i,t =
ai,tqP 11
t= 120(ai,t µi)2
109
t = { 10, 9, 8, ..., 10} (4)
as well as the aggregate t-statistics for day t:
⇥t =
P77
i=1 ✓i, tp
77
t = { 10, ..., 10} (5)
Aggregate abnormal returns are given by:
At =
1
77
77X
i=1
ai,t t = { 10, ...10} (6)
i.e. by the mean value of ai, t over the 77 remaining orphan treatments of our sample (MacKinley
1997, p. 24). Finally, we had to account for the fact that FDA orphan drug approval decisions systemat-
ically coincide with FDA marketing approval decisions. A priori, it is thus not clear whether significant
displacements in the evolution of Ci,t are due to marketing approval or to orphan drug approval. In
order to distinguish between the eﬀects exerted by these two types of events, we built a paired-sample.
We namely matched 33 orphan and "non-orphan" treatments: we associated to each orphan treat-
ment a non-orphan treatment which shares its key characteristics: same therapeutic field; same kind
of company (i.e. we matched start-ups with start-ups and great companies with great companies); and
contemporaneity (we allowed for a maximum time distance of 15 month between the FDA orphan drug
approval and the marketing approval decision in favour of the associated non-orphan treatment).
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In the case of a significant influence of the orphan drug status, stock market prices should grow
faster in the orphan sample than in the non-orphan sample. In order to test this assumption, we
retained a statistical approach largely inspired by Overgaard et al. (2000): we first calculated the
percent progression of stock market prices from day -120 to day + 10, ci,10 ⌘ Pi,10 Pi, 120Pi, 120 ; then we
used the paired-sample Student’s t-test with the aim of comparing the ci,10-means of the orphan sample
(henceforth: c¯orphan) and of the non-orphan sample (henceforth: c¯other).
4 Stock market valuation of Orphan Drugs regulatory approvals
Figure 1 draws the time series graph of mean percentage changes in stock prices Ci,t.
Figure 1: Mean percentage changes of stock prices
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As expected, we can easily identify an upward shift immediately after zero day: stock markets seem
to react positively to the disclosure of FDA orphan drug approvals. It clearly suggests that the Ci,t
series is non-stationary. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test confirms this impression (DF = -1.3329, Lag
order = 6, p-value = 0.8565). Consequently, we chose the first diﬀerence 4Ci,t ⌘ Ci,t   Ci,t 1 as the
endogenous variable of our model. We then explored a large range of model specifications. The best
outcome in terms of information criteria (Akaike and Bayesian information criteria, henceforth: AIC
and BIC) was obtained by the specification:
4Ci,t ⌘ ↵0t+ a1Ds, (7)
where the "shock" dummy variable Ds takes value 1 at date t = 2 and 0 at all other dates. This
specification corresponds to a trend aﬀected by a shock dummy variable. Main features of the model
are reported in Table 1. Figure 2 plots observed versus fitted values of the percentage changes Ci,t.
Table 1: Estimates of the time series model (7)
Estimate SD t-value Pr(> |t|)
↵0 0.0012 0.0003 4 8.4493e-05
↵1 0.0175 0.0030 5.8333 1.7560e-08
AIC = -1928.78 AICc = -1928.68 BIC = -1918.34  2 = 1847e-05
Since these curves tend to overlap, model (7) seems to be well specified. It is worth noting, however,
that this specification does not convey an ideal distribution of estimated errors. The statistics of the
Shapiro-Wilk test clearly indicates that errors cannot be supposed to be normally distributed (W =
0.9264, p-value = 1.387e-09); this shortcoming is not too problematical since our sample is suﬃciently
large to make use of the central limit theorem. What is more problematic is that according to the White
test, dispersions are aﬀected by heteroskedasticity (nR2 = 51.146, p-value = 4.5540e-11, see also Figure
6 in appendix); it should be noted that this is somehow unavoidable in time series that include major
shift movements. Finally, error terms seem not to be autocorrelated (see figures 5/6 in appendix).
The most important result conveyed by table 1 is that the shock dummy coeﬃcient ↵1 is significant
at standard confidence levels. Since the t-value of ↵1 is very far from the critical values associated to
these levels, this result should remain valid despite the presence of heteroskedasticity. We would like
to stress out that this significant shock takes place on day +2, and thus one day after the disclosure of
FDA orphan drug approval decisions.
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Figure 2: Observed against fitted series of mean percentage stock price changes
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In order to counter-check the significance result presented in the latter subsection, we apply the
Chow breakpoint test to a version of model (7) from which we removed the shock dummy variable.
The F-statistics shows that at a 1% confidence level, the ↵0 coeﬃcient is significantly diﬀerent before
and after disclosure of FDA approval decisions (F = 6.9979, p-value = 0.0087). The structural break
highlighted by the Chow test clearly suggests that FDA decisions have a significant impact on the
evolution of the Ci,t series. In this context, we should account for the heteroskedasticity problems
mentioned above. As shown by MacKinnon (1989), the standard Chow breakpoint test is remarkably
robust to heteroskedasticity when the sample is split-oﬀ right in the middle. Since this is nearly exactly
the case in our study (we have in fact 121 observations before and 120 after FDA decision disclosure),
the significance result obtained in this subsection can reasonably be considered as being trustworthy.
The previous results are clearly confirmed by the event study approach. Perhaps most interestingly,
we get confirmation of the rather surprising result that stock markets react with a delay of one day
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Figure 3: Average abnormal returns from day -10 to day + 10.
Table 1: Estimates of the time series model (7)
Estimate SD t-value Pr( > |t|)
↵0 0.0012 0.0003 4 8.4493e-05
↵1 0.0175 0.0030 5.8333 1.7560e-08
AIC = -1928.78 AICc = -1928.68 BIC = -1918.34  ˆ2 = 1.847e-05
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Figure 3: Average abnormal returns from day -10 to day + 10.
to FDA decisions: indeed, figure 3 shows an impressive peak of positive aggregate abnormal returns
on day + 2, which is significant at all standard confidence levels (see the p-value column of table 3 in
appendix). The aggregate abnormal returns associated to the other days of the event-window [day -10,
day +10 ] are not statistically significant, with the exception of day -6 at a 10% confidence level.
Table 2 presents the results of the test. At a 10% confidence level, the mean of the orphan sample
c¯orphan, is significantly greater than that of the non-orphan sample c¯other. The paired-sample Student’s
t-test is well suited to check this visual impression. In fact, the key assumptions underlying this test
are verified6.
Figure 4 shows boxplots of the (paired) orphan and non-orphan samples of stock price percent
6The set of diﬀerences between orphan treatments and the associated non-orphan treatments can be considered as
normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk normality test: W = 0.9843, p-value = 0.9037); and the variances of the two sub-
samples appear to be equal (F = 1.1168, p-value = 0.7565).
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Table 2: Paired-samples Student’s t-test (comparison of distribution means c¯orphan and c¯other)
alternative hypothesis t-statistics p-value confidence interval
c¯orphan > c¯other 1.3469 0.09373 [-0.0148,+1]
c¯orphan - c¯other = 0.0574 c¯orphan = 0.1660 c¯other = 0.1086
SDorphan = 0.2238 SDother = 0.2118 n = 33
confidence level = 95% df=32
progression ci,10. The distribution of the orphan sample seems clearly to be located at a higher level
than that of the non-orphan sample.
Figure 4: Distributions of percent progression in stock prices ci, 10 (orphan drugs vs. other drugs)
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5 Bureaucratic signals as instituting beliefs
The results presented in the previous section are somehow unexpected. It is in fact rather surprising
that the very modest marketing exclusivity extensions provided by FDA orphan drug approvals (Seoane-
Vazquez et al., 2008) have proved suﬃcient to induce significant upward shifts in the evolution of
stock market prices. Similarly, it was not necessarily foreseeable that the small diﬀerence in marketing
exclusivity lifetime between orphan and non-orphan treatments could lead to a significant gap in mean
stock price progressions. Note in this context that these results cannot be attributed to other devices
of the orphan drug legislation (such as tax credits etc.), because these advantages are activated at the
moment of orphan drug designation, and thus well before zero day (indeed several years before in the vast
majority of cases). Our explanation for these results is that the influence of FDA orphan drug approvals
goes beyond the simple quantitative eﬀect of extended marketing monopoly lifetime. Accordingly, it may
have influenced beliefs of investors, through its design and the properties of the institutions structuring
the implementation of the Orphan Drug Act.
In 1983, orphan drugs were not considered legitimate products, neither by manufacturers nor in-
vestors. During the political process, the basic incentives of the US pharmaceutical market were recog-
nized as the main reason for that situation. Albeit based on this diagnosis, the Orphan Drug Act did not
oﬀer a perfect "compensation" for the manufacturers: however, it led to a publicization of rare diseases
(Huyard 2011) and integrated this issue within the regulatory framework of an agency seen as the gate-
keeper of the pharmaceutical market (see Carpenter 2010b). The institutionalization of orphan drugs
within this regulatory scheme constituted a source of information, by providing investors with a durable
definition of these products, and by delegating the operationalization of this policy to an agency whose
procedures are known and stabilized. Simultaneously, this process created the conditions for confidence,
observable through the signaling eﬀect provided by the FDA regulatory approvals. In fact, the orphan
drug marketing exclusivity oﬀers a better quality of protection than standard patent laws: competing
companies requesting FDA marketing authorization have to prove therapeutic superiority with respect
to any FDA-approved orphan treatment applying to the same therapeutic indications. Additional ex-
perimentations required by the regulator can thus be considered as a guarantee for uninformed or poorly
informed investors on the quality of (relatively) unknown products (Carpenter and Ting 2007). In any
case, this situation is closely linked to the reputation of the FDA, since it is when an orphan drug is
approved by the agency that it is value by investors, meaning that the single designation is not enough
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to give the products all the legitimacy related to its qualification as such. This interpretation thus
suggests that investors equate the FDA orphan drug approvals to the innovative capacity of the com-
panies in question. Rather than reorienting the actors’ behaviors on the market (practically no outlets
for orphan drugs existed prior 1983), this bureaucratic signal shaped its ruling structures, iteratively
reproducing the first political signal made through the 1983 Orphan Drug Act. Consequently, one of
the key institutional features of the orphan drug market intertwined with the decisions of a bureaucratic
organization7.
Regulation has also certainly contributed to the shift from a business model to another within the
pharmaceutical industry. During the time period tested, the sector has been involved in a profound
transformation: the decline of R&D productivity has made it increasingly hard for companies to de-
velop new blockbuster drugs. As a response, they have progressively been moving towards the rare
diseases markets. In this respect, our results suggest that investors evaluate R&D successes very pos-
itively in the orphan drug market. This may be interpreted as a sign of the underlying acceptance by
investors of the strategic reorientation towards a new nichebuster-oriented business model. But due to
their critical impact for some of the most strategic steps of the development of new pharmaceutical
products, they have also played a significant role in this change : if investors seem to validate the in-
creasing importance attached by pharmaceuticals and biotechnological companies to the orphan drug
market segment, this state of aﬀairs also implies a positive funding impact of orphan drug regulatory
approvals. As a consequence, the increase of stock prices should favor the fund raising capacities of small
biotechnological firms (namely via future secondary equity oﬀers) and hence their ability to continue
the quest for new treatments. Correlatively, a positive appreciation of this bureaucratic signal acts
as a powerful incentive for firms to accentuate their positioning regarding this new type of products.
According to our results, it is indeed clear that the implementation of the Orphan Drug Act matters on
this point: by improving the stock price of the companies in question, investors have in turn reinforced
the shift within the sector. If the cause and eﬀect links are diﬃcult to estimate through our results, it
is nonetheless clear that these two dynamics have been mutually reinforcing.
7One may wonder about the surprising lack of responsiveness of stock markets highlighted in our results: prices react
in fact with a lag of one day after the disclosure of FDA orphan drug approval decisions. This state of aﬀairs may be
due to the fact that important market participants (such as mutual et pension funds) are engaged in teamwork decision
procedures (with a division of labour particularly between security analysts and portfolio managers).
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have found a significant influence of FDA orphan drug approvals on the evolution
of the stock market prices and of the abnormal returns of the companies whose treatments had been
approved. In a time series modeling framework, the dummy variable which captured the informational
shock of FDA orphan drug approvals has proved significant as regards all standard confidence levels.
Event study methodology highlights that an abnormal return is positive and highly significant one day
after disclosure of the FDA decisions. These results are confirmed by the Chow breakpoint test which
indicates a significant structural break at the moment of FDA orphan drug approvals. Finally, the
paired-sample Student’s t-test shows that the stock price progressions induced by simultaneous FDA
marketing approval/orphan drug approval decisions are significantly higher than those caused by FDA
marketing approvals of comparable "non-orphan" treatments.
While orphan drug appeared to be poorly considered by the manufacturers during the years 1960
and 1970 (and was relatively unknown by investors), the Orphan Drug Act and the delegation of its
implementation to a bureaucratic organization structured some of the essential conditions of possibility
of the market for these products. Since then, FDA regulatory approvals for rare disease treatments
have become a clear signal for investors who, by their valuation work, have legitimated in return orphan
drugs amongst manufacturers - and by this means, contributed to the shift from a business model to
another within the industry. In that case, political actors and regulation (through providing actors
with information and on the basis of their confidence in bureaucratic institutions) operated before
the creation of the market for orphan druges – a market which was virtually inexistent prior to this
intervention. Beyond the simple quantitative eﬀect of the seven-years marketing exclusivity associated
with the decision of the FDA, the significant impact of the regulatory framework depends upon the
reputation of the regulator - regulatory approval, after the experimentation phases, being more highly
valued than the single designation of a product as an orphan treatment.
This result would not appear surprising to those familiar with the social organization of the pharma-
ceutical market. In some respects, the development of the market for orphan drugs shares similarities
with that of the pharmaceutical market as a whole where "regulation did not intrude upon a pre-existing
marketplace; it constituted a new marketplace" (Carpenter 2010b, see also Marks 1997). In this context,
it is important to develop additional empirical research focused on how regulation aﬀects confidence and
beliefs. Here, we have simultaneously examined the concepts of information, confidence and reputation
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through the reactions of the stock market to bureaucratic announcements. However, more work needs
to be done to identify the boundaries between the respective eﬀects of these three dominant features
common to numerous regulatory institutions, including for markets (apparently) less regulated than
the pharmaceutical one (see also Carpenter et al. 2010). In this context, linkages could usefully be
developed between quantitative studies and sociologically informed research on the politics of industries
and industrial policy (Jullien and Smith 2008).
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